

Party activism in the populist radical right: The case of the UK Independence Party

Party Politics

1–12

© The Author(s) 2019

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/1354068819880142

journals.sagepub.com/home/ppq**Paul Whiteley** 

University of Essex, UK

Erik Larsen

University of Kent, UK

Matthew Goodwin

University of Kent, UK

Harold Clarke

UT Dallas, USA

Abstract

Recent decades have seen an upsurge of interest in populist radical right (PRR) parties. Yet despite a large body of research on PRR voters, there are few studies of the internal life of these parties. In particular, there is a dearth of research about why people are active in them. This article uses data from a unique large-scale survey of United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) members to investigate if drivers of voting support for these parties are also important for explaining party activism. Analyses show that traditional models of party activism are important for understanding engagement in UKIP, but macro-level forces captured in an expanded relative deprivation model also stimulate participation in the party. That said macro-level forces are not the dominant driver of activism.

Keywords

party activism, party member survey, populism, radical right, UKIP

Since Klaus von Beyme's (1988) influential edited volume on right-wing extremism, the past three decades have witnessed an explosion of research on populist radical right (PRR) parties. Unsurprisingly, following the rise of parties like the Front National in France, the 'Freedom Parties' in Austria and the Netherlands, the Danish People's Party in Denmark and the League in Italy, the PRR has become the most studied party family in the Western world.

The resulting literature has mainly focused on four research questions: who votes for PRR parties (e.g. Lubbers and Coenders, 2017); how to explain the considerable cross-national variation in levels of support (e.g. Golder, 2003; Norris, 2005); the policy and government effects of PRR parties (e.g. Akkerman, 2012; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015; Careja et al., 2016; Minkenberg, 2001); and the impact of PRR parties on inter-party competition (Akkerman et al., 2016; Bale et al., 2010; Wagner and Meyer, 2017).

The rising tide of electoral support for PRR parties in European democracies shows that electorates have changed their attitudes to these parties in recent years. They have become 'respectable' in a way which was not true in the past. This raises the question about the extent to which factors which motivate people to vote for PRR parties also encourage them to join and be active in these parties. We know that distrust of existing political and economic elites, feelings of being left behind by economic neglect, changing social values and perceived threats to cultural identities are

Paper submitted 6 February 2019; accepted for publication 11 September 2019

Corresponding author:

Paul Whiteley, Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, CO4 3SQ, UK.

Email: whiteley@essex.ac.uk

powerful drivers of electoral support for these parties (see Ford and Goodwin, 2014, Lubbers and Coenders, 2017; Rydgren, 2018; Spierings and Zaslove, 2017). But to what extent are these factors also important drivers of party membership and activism?

Though the literature on PRR parties has grown rapidly, there are significant omissions in the research particularly in relation to understanding their internal organization, membership and rates of activism. Noteworthy exceptions to this include regional studies of party sympathizers (Ivaldi, 1996), small-scale surveys of mid-level party elites (Ignazi and Colette, 1992), studies of the contextual predictors of membership (Biggs and Knauss, 2012; Goodwin et al., 2013) and qualitative and ethnographic studies of activists (e.g. Blee, 2007; Busher, 2015; Goodwin, 2011; Klandermans and Mayer, 2005). But such work has left important questions unanswered, such as who becomes active in these parties and why?

The lack of attention to this question is significant given that activists help to drive the parties forward. They are as important to PRR parties as they are to more traditional parties, since they play key roles in organizing, campaigning for and funding these parties as well as acting more generally as ‘ambassadors in the community’ (Scarrow, 1996). These activities help to reduce the stigma associated with these parties in the wider electorate (e.g. Art, 2011; Dinas et al., 2016; Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2017).

The lack of research on active recruits also contrasts sharply with a general renaissance of scholarly interest in mainstream party activism which has taken place in recent years (e.g. Bale et al., 2019; Van Biezen et al., 2012; Webb and Bale, 2014; Whiteley, 2011). PRR parties are also interesting because they appear to have reversed a long-established trend of declining party membership and activism in many contemporary democratic countries (Whiteley, 2011, Van Biezen et al., 2012). The evidence suggests that membership and activism has been growing in parties such as the National Front in France, the Freedom Party in Austria, the League in Italy and in our case study UKIP in the United Kingdom.¹ In short, despite calls for more work on their internal organization (Goodwin, 2006), we still know very little about PRR parties’ most committed supporters.

The resurgence of membership and activism in PRR parties raises an important question regarding whether well-established explanatory models of intra-party participation apply to them or if there is a need to modify these models (Gauja, 2015; Scarrow, 2015). In this article, we address this question by drawing on a unique large-scale membership survey of a PRR party, which includes multiple measures of activism and allows us to better explore and understand the determinants of involvement in these parties. We focus on the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which emerged as a successful PRR party in Western Europe after 2010 and played a key role in mobilizing the 2016

vote for Brexit in the European Union (EU) referendum in Britain (Clarke et al., 2017; Heath and Goodwin, 2016). To our knowledge, this is the first PRR membership survey of its kind.

Importantly, the survey was conducted when the party was at its peak, providing a comprehensive data set to test competing theories of differential activism within a PRR party. Compared to other surveys on party members, we have a sufficient number of respondents with varying levels and types of involvement to investigate the different theories in question. This allows us to test the extent to which traditional explanations of party activism apply to the PRR while at the same time examining if there are unique drivers of activism in this party family.

In brief, analyses show that people who are active in the PRR are motivated by many of the same factors which explain activism in more traditional parties across the political spectrum. In this respect, existing theories of party activism apply to UKIP much as they do to mainstream parties. That said, there are also distinctive factors which stimulate intra-party involvement in UKIP associated with the relative deprivation theory and which help to drive electoral support for the party. To the extent that UKIP is a representative case, the inference is that PRR parties differ from their mainstream rivals, but only to a limited extent.

Explaining party activism

Joining and becoming active in a political party is one form of political participation. Thus models which explain why people become actively engaged in politics are all potentially relevant for explaining differential types and levels of intra-party activity. Some of these relate to long-term social processes involving social class, family socialization and community cohesion. The civic voluntarism and social capital models are examples since they both stress the importance of individual and community resources as major drivers of political participation (Pattie et al., 2004; Verba et al., 1995). In the civic voluntarism model, individual resources such as income, social status and education are important, whereas in the social capital model, community resources such as voluntary activity and interpersonal trust are prominent (Putnam, 2000).

PRR parties, however, often emerge as major players over relatively short time intervals. Although ideologically distinct parties like the Sweden Democrats and UKIP have fairly lengthy histories, they have enjoyed quickly paced breakthroughs, suggesting that the accompanying rise in party membership and activism cannot be adequately explained by slow-moving social processes. For this reason, we focus on three theoretical models that have been developed to explain differential party activism and which are not subject to this criticism.

The first is the general incentives model, originally developed at the time of the first surveys of party members

in Britain (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley et al., 1994, 2006). The model is based on the idea that there are incentives which motivate individuals to join and become active in a party organization. Perceptions of the costs and benefits of political action are at the centre of the theory, but it focuses on a wider range of incentives than narrowly defined cost/benefit calculations. The model also includes social-psychological variables relating to social norms and ideological beliefs which help to motivate individuals to get involved. It distinguishes between collective and selective benefits, where the former are ‘public goods’ which motivate members seeking to promote policies that apply to society as a whole, whereas the latter are ‘private goods’ such as individual political ambitions which are only relevant to those who get involved.² Since its inception, the general incentives model has been employed to explain party membership and intra-organizational activism in various parties and countries (Gallagher and Marsh, 2002; Poletti et al., 2018; Ridder et al., 2015; Van Haute and Gauja, 2015).

Also of interest is the mobilization model which focuses on social networks as mechanisms for recruiting individuals into politics. Simply put, some people become actively engaged because the opportunities for them to do so are greater than for others and because they are persuaded to get involved by ‘significant others’ in their families and social networks (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Mobilization can be driven by social dynamics and social connections with peers and these have been shown to be important drivers of political action (e.g. Kahne and Bowyer, 2018; Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017; Sinclair, 2012). Furthermore, active involvement in politics can be ‘socially contagious’, so that individuals with connections to an activist become more likely to be active themselves (Bond et al., 2012). For example, Fieldhouse and Cutts (2012) document that an individual’s participation is influenced by whether other people in his/her household participate in politics.

Although these two models have their differences, they are generally united in contesting the idea that party activism is solely a response to ‘top-down’ elite-level mobilization. This is an important point given that much of the research on the radical right points to the importance of ‘charismatic’ leaders in winning support (e.g. Bos et al., 2011; De Lange and Art, 2011; Eatwell, 2017) or, increasingly, the role of mass media (Berning et al., 2018; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007; Sheets et al., 2016). These studies suggest that ‘macro-mobilization’ could be important for recruiting party members and activists in PRR parties, alongside the more micro-level factors discussed earlier. A similar point can be made about relative deprivation theory which is the third of the models of political participation we examine. This model is distinctive since it contains variables which are similar to those discussed in the literature on voting for PRR parties, and so we examine it next.

Relative deprivation and party activism in PRR parties

Relative deprivation theory was originally introduced by Stouffer et al. (1949) and developed further by Runciman (1966). The theory is based on the proposition that individuals develop expectations about how economic, political and social systems should treat them, and at the same time judgements about how they are actually treated in practice. The more negative the comparison between what people expect and what they receive, the more likely they are to experience frustration and anger. These emotional responses are a ‘potent, volatile, instigator of action’ (Marcus et al., 2000: 26) and a stimulus to political involvement which can include becoming active in a party (Conover and Feldman, 1986).

This raises an interesting question about whether there is a version of the relative deprivation model of political participation which applies to PRR parties and which takes into account the notion of ‘macro-mobilization’ arising from forces in society as a whole. If so, this could be quite important for recruiting members to PRR parties and also for explaining why they are growing in comparison with many mainstream parties. This idea reflects an important theme in the literature on support for radical right parties, namely that large numbers of individuals perceive of having been ‘left behind’ by macro-level developments in contemporary society and the economy.

Changes in contemporary capitalism engendered by globalization, international migration and stagnating wages, particularly among low skilled workers, have created a situation in which large sections of the electorate have failed to share in the fruits of economic growth. Trade imbalances between Western countries and Asia, particularly China, accompanied by the outsourcing of skilled manufacturing jobs and the movement of industries to low-cost countries are important causes of growing inequality (Atkinson, 2015; Galbraith, 2012). These economic trends, coupled with the trauma of the Great Recession, have created serious political problems for the mainstream parties across the democratic world (Stiglitz, 2002).

These developments give rise to a syndrome of grievances based on the economic marginalization of individuals, perceived threats from immigrants, refugees and ethnic-minority groups and identity politics (Betz, 1994; Clarke et al., 2017; Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Mudde, 2007; Oesch, 2008; Posner, 2010). At the same time, those encountering these adverse circumstances tend to share authoritarian or socially conservative values, which are often associated with low levels of formal education (Ford and Goodwin 2014; Oesch, 2008; Rydgren, 2012). So threat perceptions arising from adverse economic and cultural developments are reinforced by rapid changes in society which challenge traditional values (Stenner, 2005).

Gest et al. (2017), for example, argue that support for PRR movements in the United States and United Kingdom is rooted in anxiety about the perceived discrepancy between current status of individuals and their past status. Similarly, Gidron and Hall (2017) contend that the appeal of PRR parties is especially strong among those with lower levels of subjective social status, and an accompanying belief that they are not being accorded the appropriate level of respect or esteem within the social order. From this perspective, becoming a PRR activist is part of a quest to regain social status that is perceived to have been lost by developments in the economy and society.

These different ideas fit within a relative deprivation model of activism, but it is essentially a micro-theory about individuals reacting to circumstances in their own lives (Runciman, 1966). In contrast, the ‘left behind’ thesis has its origins in broader macro-level developments in economy and society which have mobilized some people into political action. These dynamics are important since as the earlier discussion indicated most research on political participation focuses on the positive impact of individual resources on involvement, for example, in the civic voluntarism model (Verba et al., 1995). In the case of relative deprivation theory, however, individual perceptions of a lack of resources are the motivational force.

If macro-level forces are important drivers of activism within populist right parties, a modified relative deprivation model of activism which takes these into account could have important explanatory power. In the next section, we describe the research design and operationalization of variables used to test the general incentives, mobilization and the modified relative deprivation model of party activism.

Research design and data

A key challenge to the study of the populist right is to gather a sufficient number of observations to be able to examine systematic differences within the parties. UKIP is a desirable case for study because, at its peak, the party had a large number of members with varying levels and types of activity.³ Accordingly, we conducted a full membership survey between December 2014 and January 2015, providing a unique opportunity to test the various models described above for one of the most successful PRR parties in Western Europe (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2016).⁴

Although it was founded in 1993, UKIP did not have major electoral successes until the 2010–2015 Parliament when it shifted away from its origins as a single-issue movement opposed to Britain’s membership of the EU and added opposition to immigration and anti-establishment populism to its programme. UKIP won the 2014 European Parliament elections outright with 26.6% of the vote, polled nearly 13% of the national vote at the 2015 general election and then campaigned vigorously for Brexit during the 2016

referendum on Britain’s EU membership (Clarke et al., 2017; Goodwin and Heath, 2016). Support for the party subsequently collapsed in the 2017 general election as many former UKIP voters switched to the Conservative Party whose leader, Theresa May, had set out the case for a ‘hard Brexit’ in her Lancaster House speech in January 2017 (Whiteley et al., 2018).

Our UKIP membership survey was conducted during the peak period of the party’s electoral success. After negotiating with the national leadership of the party which agreed to allow the researchers access to the membership database to conduct an online survey, the aim was to achieve a census of the membership rather than a sample.⁵ In the event, the achieved sample size was very large ($N = 14,683$) in comparison with earlier surveys of party members. Our interest in this article is delineating and explaining levels and types of party activism and thus the survey of UKIP members asked a wide variety of questions (see Online Appendix).

To give a flavour of the items used to measure party activism, one question simply asked: ‘Overall, how active are you in UKIP?’ with respondents given four options: ‘not at all active’, ‘not very active’, ‘fairly active’ and ‘very active’. Figure 1 shows that most of the respondents reported being active only to a limited extent. That said, slightly over one-sixth considered themselves to be ‘fairly active’ and another slightly smaller group said that they were ‘very active’.

In addition to the activism question, we employed several different measures of involvement. These were: hours spent on party work every week; hours spent on party work during the European Parliament election of 2014; participation in party conferences; seeking office as a UKIP candidate; displaying election posters; signing petitions supported by the party; donating money to the party; distributing election materials; participating in party meetings; helping out at party functions; and canvassing on behalf of the party and its candidates (see the Online Appendix). Although these measures are correlated with one another, there is a great degree of heterogeneity in the strength of the relationships. For example, the correlation (r) between helping at a UKIP party function and attended a UKIP meeting is 0.66, whereas the correlation between donating money to UKIP and signing a petition supported by the party is considerably weaker at 0.27.

The analysis of the structure of intra-party activism proceeded by using an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the various activism variables to identify if there are distinctive latent variables underlying the measures and which of them were most strongly associated with the factors. These EFA results provided guidance for specifying a confirmatory factor analysis model (CFA) of the structure of various activities in UKIP (Acock, 2013). This CFA model has the advantage of estimating correlations between factors, unlike the exploratory analysis, allowing us to identify how closely related they are in




Figure 1. Self-reported levels of activity in UKIP. UKIP: United Kingdom Independence Party.

practice. The relationships in the CFA model are shown in the path diagram in Figure 2.

Figure 2 indicates that there are three latent variables that structure the party activity variables.⁶ These three factors relate to supporting the party without becoming very involved, being engaged in various ‘face-to-face’ activities for the party and thirdly being intensely involved. Thus, the ‘Support’ factor identifies things like donating money and displaying election posters. The ‘Activism’ factor includes items like attending party meetings and conferences, canvassing at election times and spending time working for the party in inter-election periods. Finally, the ‘Intense Activism’ factor refers to the work of a relatively small number of members who are very heavily involved on a continuous basis as candidates for local and national office and also as sitting local councillors. The latter work harder than ordinary members and activists, and so constitute the elite of the party membership. The CFA reveals strong correlations between the three latent variables suggesting that for purposes of analysis they can be combined into a single overarching activism scale.⁷ Figure 3 shows the distribution of UKIP members’ scores on the overall activism scale.

For the variables which operationalize the relative deprivation, mobilization and general incentive models, we rely on standard questions used in previous studies (see Online Appendix). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the demographics and activism scales in the analysis.⁸ It shows that UKIP members are predominantly male, middle-aged and have relatively modest incomes and comparatively low levels of education. Similar findings have emerged from earlier studies of the UKIP membership and also from studies of voting support for the party (Clarke et al., 2017; Ford and Goodwin, 2014).

Analysing intra-party participation

We begin by studying relationships between explanatory variables in the three participation models and the combined activism scale. We sketch out the key variables in each of the models here, but more detailed definitions can be found in the Online Appendix. These analyses help us to understand which model provides the best account of broadly defined activism in UKIP.

To consider the micro-level indicators in the relative deprivation model first, they are based on two Likert indicators combined into a single scale: ‘There is often a big gap between what people like yourself expect out of life and what you actually get’ and ‘The Government generally treats people like yourself fairly’. In addition, another micro-level variable invites respondents to compare their own economic circumstances with those of the country as a whole. In this case, if respondents feel that the country is doing well while they are doing badly, this captures perceptions of being ‘left behind’ in the face of increasing national prosperity.

Following the earlier discussion, we revise this micro-level relative deprivation model by adding a number of macro-level variables which relate to respondent attitudes to developments in the economy and society. Firstly, we include dissatisfaction with the state of democracy in Britain and also a measure of anti-elitist sentiments. The latter is measured with a battery of items including ‘Economic inequality is a major problem in Britain’ and ‘Corporate greed is a major problem in Britain’. Secondly, there are three policy related items which may give rise to perceptions of deprivation. These relate to the state of the economy, dissatisfaction with immigration and of course dissatisfaction with the key issue of UK membership of the EU.

The mobilization model includes a variable which measures the respondent’s attention to politics, thereby capturing the idea of cognitive mobilization. It also includes measures of the role of social networks in recruiting and retaining party members over time. The first of these is based on a question asking if they were recruited into the party via ‘significant others’ in their social networks as opposed to joining on their own initiative. The second captures the extent to which they see politics as a means of developing social contacts with like-minded people. This is captured by indicators such as ‘Being an active party member is a good way to meet interesting people’ and ‘Getting involved in party activities can be fun’. The mobilization model also includes a question about whether respondents were party members in the past, and also about their parent’s involvement in political parties when they were growing up. The latter is designed to identify any socialization effects arising from their family background which might induce them to join a party such as UKIP.

The general incentives model focuses on perceptions of the costs and benefits of party membership and also




Figure 2. Path diagram of relationships between measured activism variables and three latent activism factors. Observed activism variables are in rectangles and latent activism factors are in circles. Curved lines with double-headed arrows indicate error variances for observed activism variables; straight lines from latent factors to observed variables indicate factor loadings; curved lines between latent factors indicate inter-factor correlations.




Figure 3. Distribution of scores on overall UKIP activism scale. Overall activism scale scores are calculated as sum of scores on three party activism factors. UKIP: United Kingdom Independence Party.

includes measures of selective benefits such as the respondent’s political ambitions. It separates out collective benefits from private benefits, by asking respondents to compare their affective feelings for UKIP in comparison

with Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. The idea here is to capture the extent to which they are attached to the party as an organization which can bring them policy success and benefits in comparison with its rivals. Other indicators include the role of social norms, perceptions of a sense of civic duty and left-right ideology as mechanisms for stimulating activism in the party. The general incentives model also shares with the mobilization model an indicator of the influence of other people in promoting people to join and be active in the party.

Table 2 contains the estimates of overall party activism scale using the different models in the analysis. The general incentives model is clearly the most successful in terms of goodness of fit with an R^2 statistic of 0.28 and also the smallest (best) AIC value.⁹ All predictors in the model with the exception of the respondent’s attitudes to immigration are statistically significant. Efficacy-discounted collective benefits have a positive impact on activism, while perceptions of the costs of activism have a negative impact. Equally, political ambitions, social norms relating to participation, social networks and perceptions that the respondent has a duty to get involved in politics all have positive impacts on activism. Similarly, individuals are more likely

Table 1. Selected descriptive statistics in the modelling.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Percentile (25)	Median	Pctl (75)	Max
Activism scale	12,114	-0.00	1.81	-1.93	-1.42	-0.70	1.06	5.34
Political support	12,114	-0.00	0.43	-0.65	-0.36	-0.09	0.28	1.08
Political activism	12,114	-0.00	0.70	-0.69	-0.60	-0.27	0.53	1.47
High-intensity activism	12,114	0.00	0.77	-0.59	-0.55	-0.34	0.29	2.79
Male	12,114	0.84	0.37	0	1	1	1	1
Age	12,114	4.88	1.33	1	4	5	6	6
Income	12,114	3.14	1.78	1	2	3	4	8
Education	12,114	0.50	0.50	0	0	1	1	1

Note: See Online Appendix for details of codings.

Table 2. Rival models of the overall activism rates of UKIP party members.

	Micro relative deprivation	Revised relative deprivation	Mobilization	General incentives
Age	0.02 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.25*** (0.01)
Male	-0.04 (0.04)	0.002 (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Education	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Income	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Left behind	0.10*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)		
Micro relative deprivation	0.06*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		
Democracy dissatisfaction		0.01 (0.02)		
Anti-elitist perceptions		0.0002 (0.02)		
Economic evaluations		-0.16*** (0.02)		
Dissatisfaction with the EU		0.41*** (0.04)		
Dissatisfaction with immigration		0.06*** (0.02)		
Social network recruitment			0.95*** (0.06)	
Attention to politics			0.19*** (0.01)	
Parents politically active			0.06*** (0.02)	
Party member in past			0.30*** (0.03)	
Evaluations of Farage			0.05*** (0.01)	
Evaluations of Farage squared			0.01*** (0.001)	
Weighted collective benefits				0.002*** (0.0001)
Perception of costs				-0.20*** (0.01)
Civic duty				0.06*** (0.01)
Political ambitions				0.62*** (0.02)
Social norms				0.06*** (0.02)
Left-right ideology				0.15*** (0.04)
Ideology squared				-0.02*** (0.003)
Social network motivations			0.39*** (0.02)	0.37*** (0.02)
Constant	-0.31** (0.12)	-1.53*** (0.20)	-1.89*** (0.13)	-1.84*** (0.16)
AIC	48,505.22	48,304.47	47,189.53	44,763.09
Observations	12,114	12,114	12,114	12,114
R ²	0.02	0.04	0.12	0.28

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Smaller values of the AIC indicate a better model performance. AIC: Akaike Information Criteria; UKIP: United Kingdom Independence Party; EU: European Union.

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

to be active the further to the right they are on the left-right ideological scale. However, the quadratic specification of this variable shows that the effect weakens as they move further to the right. Finally, education has a positive effect on activism, and income has a negative effect.

While the general incentives model is the most successful, it is clear that the relative deprivation and mobilization models contribute to explaining overall activism as well. In the micro-relative deprivation model, indicators of the

respondent feeling left behind by national prosperity and also the relative deprivation scale have statistically significant impacts on activism. These sources of individual feelings of deprivation act as stimuli to activism. Similarly, in common with the general incentives model, education has a positive impact on activism and income a negative impact. This finding itself can be a source of relative deprivation if individuals perceive a gap between their educational backgrounds and their incomes.

The revised relative deprivation model adds macro-level policy variables relating to the economy, immigration and UK membership of the EU. It is clear that these national policy variables have an important impact on activism. Individuals who are optimistic about the state of the national economy are less likely to be active, so grievances over the national economy help to drive participation. In addition dissatisfaction with UK membership of the EU and also with immigration into Britain serves to stimulate activism. On the other hand, anti-elitist attitudes and dissatisfaction with the state of democracy in Britain have no effects. These findings suggest that concrete policy grievances at the macro-level drive activism, but rather more abstract ideas about the state of democracy and elite behaviour do not.

Turning next to the mobilization model, this shows that members who pay more attention to politics were more likely to be active, which is not surprising. In addition, individuals who were persuaded joined the party by 'significant others' and were attracted by the desire to meet like-minded people were also more active. It is clear from these results that social networks mobilize individuals to be active. There is also evidence of family socialization effects as well, since they were more likely to be active if their parents were involved in party politics when they were growing up. The same point can be made about respondents who had previously been a party member in the past which boosted their rates of activism in the party.

One of the most important factors in the mobilization model is attitudes to Nigel Farage, the party leader at the time. This variable compares his popularity among members with that of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders. It shows that individuals who liked him a lot and at the same time disliked other leaders a lot were more likely to be active. Moreover, the quadratic specification shows that as this gap grows wider the bigger the effect on activism. This variable captures how anti-elite sentiments arising from a distrust of conventional political leaders and attraction to their own leader have a direct effect on participation in UKIP.

Table 2 looks at the overall relationship between the different models and activism, but as the earlier discussion indicates we identified three different types of activism in the data. Accordingly, in the next section, we examine how these models of participation combine to influence the different types of participation.

Modelling the determinants of types of activism

The three types of participation in UKIP identified in Figure 2 were described as 'Political Support', 'Political Activism' and 'High-Intensity Activism', each one describing successively higher levels of involvement in the grass-roots party organization. To shed further light on relationships,

we estimate the effects of a combination of all three models of activism on each of the activism scales. The results of this analysis appear in Table 3.

The first column in Table 3 contains the composite model estimates of the overall activism scale utilized in Table 2. It is clear that the goodness of fit (0.31) is higher than in the individual models in Table 2 and the AIC has improved, indicating that all three models make an independent contribution to explaining activism. Interestingly enough looking at the demographics in the composite model the educational effects have disappeared, whereas age, income and to a lesser extent gender continue to have important effects on activism. This shows that in the most comprehensive specification of the activism model, elderly White males on relative modest incomes are more likely to be active than members in general.

In the relative deprivation section of the composite model, perceptions of being left behind, economic evaluations and dissatisfaction with the EU continue to be significant predictors of activism. However, anti-elitist attitudes have a negative impact on activism, which reinforces the earlier point that rather abstract ideas relating to corporate greed, inequality and the state of democracy in Britain do not appear to motivate UKIP members to be more active, even though many of them agree with the statements on which the scales were built.

As far as the mobilization model is concerned, all of the variables continue to be strong predictors in the composite model, except for evaluations of Nigel Farage which still has an effect, but it is linear rather than a quadratic. Thus the UKIP leader plays an important role in mobilizing members to be active, alongside their connections to social networks and their past experience of party membership. The effect of parental involvement in party politics is no longer significant indicating that its effects are explained by other variables.

The general incentives section of the composite model is very similar to the individual version in Table 2. Thus activism is motivated by collective benefits and inhibited by perceptions of costs. A sense of civic duty, ambitions to be involved in politics, social norms and motivations arising from the process of politics itself all continue to have important effects. Finally, party members to the right of the political spectrum are more likely to be active than others, but the effects weaken as they move further to the right.

The remaining columns in Table 3 contain estimates of the political support, political activism and high-intensity activism scales and they are all very similar to the overall activism model. In every model age, income and gender are significant predictors of activism and support, but not education. In relation to the relative deprivation model, perceptions of being left behind continue to be significant predictors, although the coefficients suggest they are more important for activists than for supporters. The micro-relative deprivation scale has changed signs and has a

Table 3. Composite models of the dimensions of UKIP party activism.

	Overall activism	Political support	Political activism	High-intensity activism
Age	0.22*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.003)	0.09*** (0.005)	0.07*** (0.01)
Male	0.07* (0.04)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Education	0.09*** (0.03)	0.001 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Income	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.004)
Left behind	0.04*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.02*** (0.003)
Micro relative deprivation	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.004)
Democracy dissatisfaction	0.02 (0.02)	0.001 (0.004)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Anti-elitist perceptions	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Economic evaluations	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.03*** (0.004)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Dissatisfaction with the EU	0.32*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)
Dissatisfaction with immigration	0.01 (0.02)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Social network recruitment	0.85*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.01)	0.36*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.02)
Attention to politics	0.05*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.02*** (0.004)	0.02*** (0.004)
Parents politically active	0.03 (0.02)	0.01** (0.004)	0.004 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)
Party member in past	0.17*** (0.03)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Evaluations of Farage	0.02* (0.01)	0.003 (0.003)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)
Evaluations of Farage squared	0.002* (0.001)	0.001*** (0.0003)	0.0004 (0.0004)	0.001 (0.0005)
Weighted collective benefits	0.002*** (0.0001)	0.0005*** (0.0000)	0.001*** (0.0000)	0.001*** (0.0000)
Perception of costs	-0.19*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.004)	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Civic duty	0.06*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.004)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Political ambitions	0.60*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.004)	0.23*** (0.01)	0.25*** (0.01)
Social norms	0.05*** (0.02)	0.02*** (0.004)	0.01* (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Left-right ideology	0.16*** (0.04)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Ideology squared	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.001)
Social network motivations	0.37*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.004)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)
Constant	-3.06*** (0.23)	-0.84*** (0.06)	-1.09*** (0.09)	-1.13*** (0.10)
AIC	44,216.65	10,321.96	21,684.84	23,719.89
Observations	12,114	12,114	12,114	12,114
R ²	0.31	0.26	0.28	0.31

Note: AIC: Akaike Information Criteria; UKIP: United Kingdom Independence Party; EU: European Union.

negative impact on supporters and activists but does not appear to influence high-intensity activists. This suggests that when controls for other variables are in place, these rather abstract items have a tendency to demobilize some respondents. A similar point can be made about the anti-elite scale. The macro-policy variables are important in all three models but they tend to be stronger for activists than for supporters.

In the mobilization model, the effects tend to be stronger in the case of activists and high-intensity activists than for supporters. This is true for the recruitment of members through their social networks, and also in relation to incentives to build a network of like-minded individuals after joining the party. In this regard, past party membership remains a strong predictor in all three models, though not parental party activism. Nigel Farage continued to have an important effect on participation, but the UKIP leader had a bigger impact on supporters than he did on activists. This suggests that he was more important for recruiting new members than for encouraging existing members to become more active.

The general incentives model plays an important role in explaining participation in all three models. Not

surprisingly, political ambition is more important for the activists than supporters, although some of the latter harbour political ambitions as well. In addition, while all are aware of the costs of participation, they have a bigger deterrent effect among activists than for supporters. Finally, all three types of participant are influenced by a sense of civic duty, social norms regarding participation and the left-right ideology scale. As regards the latter, the effects of ideology are stronger for the activists and high-intensity activists than for the supporters. Finally, as we observed in connection with the mobilization model, the effects of social networks are all positive, but activists are more likely to be motivated by them than supporters, which is not surprising given that they interact much more closely with each other.

Conclusions

Findings from a survey of UKIP's membership conducted in late 2014 and early 2015 suggest that members of PRR parties, which are prominent in many EU member states, may have a lot in common with mainstream party members when it comes to understanding what motivates intra-party

involvement. In UKIP's case, many of the factors used to explain mainstream activism—such as cognitive mobilization and various incentives for involvement—are at work, bringing people in to join this PRR party and subsequently encouraging some of them to be active.

The findings confirm the validity of existing models of activism that have been tested on different party families in different countries in previous research, and the results do not suggest that PRR parties are fundamentally different from these others. Second, when we use the data to take context into account with additional control variables (e.g. when people decided to become a member of UKIP¹⁰), we find substantially identical results suggesting the findings are robust.

The present analyses point to the need for a more nuanced understanding of recruitment and activism in radical right parties. Elite mobilization is an important factor in explaining participation in the grass roots but it is far from being the whole story. Although variables tapping such influences on participation did account for some variation in the models, they were not as crucial as we might expect if the party members were simply motivated by a top-down mobilization process driven by charismatic leaders.

This unique survey of UKIP members throws considerable light on the predictive power of alternative models of activism within the populist right. However, this advantage comes at the cost of generalizability and raises the question about the extent to which present findings apply to other populist parties in other countries. While future research will benefit from conducting similar large-scale surveys for such parties, we believe that results documented here will show a robust general pattern for the determinants of party activism within the populist right.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Paul Whiteley  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5640-9476>

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. In 1990, the National Front in France had 50,000 members and by 2006 it had 75,000. The Freedom party in Austria had 42,413 members in 1990 and by 2014 it had 50,000. The Lega

Nord (renamed the 'League') in Italy had 112,400 members in 1992 and 182,502 in 2010. See the Members and Activists in Political Parties (MAPP) database on party membership <https://www.projectmapp>.

2. The predictors of membership and activism in parties in the general incentives model are: (1) The perception of the probability that their participation in a party will achieve a desired collective outcome; (2) The respondent's desired collective outcomes, such as changes in policies if their party wins an election; (3) The assessment of the selective outcome benefits of activism; that is, material or career benefits; (4) assessment of the selective process benefits of activism or the intrinsic rewards associated with involvement in political action; (5) altruistic motivations for activism; (6) perception of social norms relating to activism, or a desire to conform to the expectations of significant others; (7) expressive or emotional motivations for activism, such as the strength of an attachment to a party or leader; (8) perception of the costs of activism (see Seyd and Whiteley, 1992).
3. Details of the requirements for joining the party can be found on: <https://join.ukip.org/joinonline.aspx?type=1/>.
4. A legal agreement with the party prevented the researchers from releasing analyses of the data until 2017.
5. An additional survey of the relatively small number of members who did not have access to the internet was also conducted by mail for validation purposes. No significant differences existed between the online and mail survey respondents.
6. The observed variables are in boxes and the latent variables in ovals, the former including error terms (not shown).
7. The correlation (r) between Support and Activism is 0.88, between Support and High-Intensity Activism 0.86 and between Activism and High-Intensity Activism is 0.82.
8. Note that descriptive statistics for all variables appear in the Online Appendix.
9. The general incentives model has many more variables than the other models and for this reason might be expected to be a better fit. The Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) penalizes models with larger numbers of variables and so provides a better measure of fit than the R^2 statistic.
10. See Online Appendix.

References

- Acock A (2013) *Discovering Structural Equation Modeling Using Stata*. College Station: Stata Press.
- Akkerman T (2012) Comparing radical right parties in government: immigration and integration policies in nine countries (1996–2010). *West European Politics* 35(3): 511–529.
- Akkerman T, Lange SLD and Rooduijn M (eds) (2016) *Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?* London: Routledge.
- Albertazzi D and McDonnell D (2015) *Populists in Power*. London: Routledge.

- Art D (2011) *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Atkinson A (2015) *Inequality: What Can Be Done?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bale T, Webb P and Poletti M (2019) Participating locally and nationally: explaining the offline and online activism of British party members. *Political Studies* 67(3): 658–675.
- Bale T, Green-Pedersen C, Krouwel A, et al. (2010) If you can't beat them, join them? Explaining social democratic responses to the challenge from the populist radical right in Western Europe. *Political Studies* 58(3): 410–426.
- Berning CC, Lubbers M and Schlueter E (2018) Media attention and radical right-wing populist party sympathy: longitudinal evidence from the Netherlands. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 31: 93–120.
- Betz HG (1994) *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: Springer.
- Beyme VK (1988) Right-wing extremism in post-war Europe. *West European Politics* 11(2): 1–18.
- Biggs M and Knauss S (2012) Explaining membership in the British National Party: a multilevel analysis of contact and threat. *European Sociological Review* 28(5): 633–646.
- Blee KM (2007) Ethnographies of the far right. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 36(2): 119–128.
- Bond RM, Fariss CJ, Jones JJ, et al. (2012) A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political mobilization. *Nature* 489: 295–298.
- Boomgaarden HG and Vliegenthart R (2007) Explaining the rise of anti-immigrant parties: the role of news media content. *Electoral Studies* 26(2): 404–417.
- Bos L, Brug WVD and Vreese CD (2011) How the media shape perceptions of right-wing populist leaders. *Political Communication* 28(2): 182–206.
- Busher J (2015) *The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League*. London: Routledge.
- Careja R, Elmelund-Præstekær C, Klitgaard MB, et al. (2016) Direct and indirect welfare chauvinism as party strategies: an analysis of the Danish People's Party. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 39(4): 435–457.
- Clarke H, Goodwin MJ and Paul W (2017) *Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Conover P and Feldman S (1986) Emotional reactions to the economy: I'm mad as hell and I'm not going to take it any more. *American Journal of Political Science* 30(1): 50–78.
- De Lange SL and Art D (2011) Fortuyn versus wilders: an agency-based approach to radical right party building. *West European Politics* 34(6): 1229–1249.
- Dinas E, Georgiadou V, Konstantinidis I, et al. (2016) From dusk to dawn: local party organization and party success of right-wing extremism. *Party Politics* 22(1): 80–92.
- Eatwell R (2017) Charisma and the radical right. In: Jens R (ed) *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ellinas AA and Lamprianou I (2017) Far right activism and electoral outcomes. *Party Politics* 25: 448–460.
- Fieldhouse E and Cutts D (2012) The companion effect: household and local context and the turnout of young people. *Journal of Politics* 74(3): 856–869.
- Ford R and Goodwin MJ (2014) *Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Galbraith JK (2012) *Inequality and Instability*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gallagher M and Marsh M (2002) *Days of Blue Loyalty: The Politics of Membership in the Fine Gael Party*. Dublin: PSAI Press.
- Gauja A (2015) The construction of party membership. *European Journal of Political Research* 54(2): 232–248.
- Gest J, Reny T and Mayer J (2017) Roots of the radical right: nostalgic deprivation in the United States and Britain. *Comparative Political Studies* 51: 1694–1719.
- Gidron N and Hall PA (2017) The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots of the populist right. *The British Journal of Sociology* 68: S57–S84.
- Golder M (2003) Explaining variation in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 36(4): 432–466.
- Goodwin MJ (2006) The rise and faults of the internalist perspective in extreme right studies. *Representation* 42(4): 347–364.
- Goodwin MJ (2011) *New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party*. London: Routledge.
- Goodwin MJ and Heath O (2016) The 2016 referendum, Brexit and the left behind: an aggregate-level analysis of the result. *Political Quarterly* 87(3): 323–332.
- Goodwin M and Milazzo C (2016) *UKIP: Inside the Campaign to Redraw the Map of British Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Goodwin M, Ford R and Cutts D (2013) Extreme right foot soldiers, legacy effects and deprivation: a contextual analysis of the leaked British National Party (BNP) membership list. *Party Politics* 19(6): 887–906.
- Ignazi P and Colette Y (1992) New and old extreme right parties: the French Front National and the Italian Movimento Sociale. *European Journal of Political Research* 22(1): 101–121.
- Ivaldi G (1996) Conservation, revolution and protest: a case study in the political cultures of the French National Front's members and sympathizers. *Electoral Studies* 15(3): 339–362.
- Kahne J and Bowyer B (2018) The political significance of social media activity and social networks. *Political Communication* 35: 470–493.
- Kertzer JD and Zeitoff T (2017) A bottom-up theory of public opinion about foreign policy. *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3): 543–558.
- Klandermans B and Mayer N (2005) *Extreme Right Activists in Europe: Through the Magnifying Glass*. London: Routledge.
- Lubbers M and Coenders M (2017) Nationalistic attitudes and voting for the radical right in Europe. *European Union Politics* 18(1): 98–118.

- Marcus GE, Russell NW and MacKuen M (2000) *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Minkenberg M (2001) The radical right in public office: agenda-setting and policy effects. *West European Politics* 24(4): 1–21.
- Mudde C (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris P (2005) *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oesch D (2008) Explaining workers' support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review* 29(3): 349–373.
- Pattie C, Seyd P and Whiteley P (2004) *Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Poletti M, Webb P and Bale T (2018) Why do only some people who support parties actually join them? Evidence from Britain. *West European Politics* 42(1): 156–172.
- Posner RA (2010) *The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Putnam R (2000) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Shuster.
- Ridder J, Holsteyn JV and Koole R (2015) Party membership in the Netherlands. In: Haute EV and Gauja A (eds) *Party Members and Activists*. London: Routledge, pp. 134–150.
- Rooduijn M (2014) The mesmerising message: the diffusion of populism in public debates in Western European media. *Political Studies* 62(4): 726–744.
- Runciman WG (1966) *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Rydgren J (ed) (2012) *Class Politics and the Radical Right*. London: Routledge.
- Rydgren J (ed) (2018) *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scarrow SE (1996) *Parties and Their Members*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schmitt-Beck R and Mackenrodt C (2010) Social networks and mass media as mobilizers and demobilizers: a study of turnout at a German local election. *Electoral Studies* 29: 392–404.
- Seyd P and Whiteley P (2002) *Labour's Grassroots: The Politics of Party Membership*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Sheets P, Bos L and Boomgaarden HG (2016) Media cues and citizen support for right-wing populist parties. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 28(3): 307–330.
- Sinclair B (2012) *The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Spierings N and Zaslove A (2017) Gender, populist attitudes, and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties. *West European Politics* 40(4): 821–847.
- Stenner K (2005) *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stiglitz J (2002) *Globalization and its Discontents*. London: Penguin Books.
- Stouffer SA, Suchman EA, DeVinney LC, et al. (1949) *The American Soldier: Adjustment to Army Life*, Vol. 1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Taggart P (1998) A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems. *European Journal of Political Research* 33: 363–388.
- Van Biezen I, Mair P and Poguntke T (2012) Going, going, . . . gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 51(1): 24–56.
- Van Haute E and Gauja A (eds) (2015) *Party Members and Activists*. London: Routledge.
- Verba S, Schlozman KL and Brady HE (1995) *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Wagner M and Meyer TM (2017) The radical right as niche parties? The ideological landscape of party systems in Western Europe, 1980–2014. *Political Studies* 65: 84–107.
- Webb P and Bale T (2014) Why do Tories defect to UKIP? Conservative party members and the temptations of the populist radical right. *Political Studies* 62(4): 961–970.
- Whiteley PF (2011) Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across the democratic world. *Party Politics* 17(1): 21–44.
- Whiteley PF, Goodwin M and Clarke HD (2018) The rise and fall of UKIP 2007–2017. In: Nicholas A and Bartle J (eds) *None Past the Post: Britain at the Polls 2017*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 78–99.
- Whiteley P, Seyd P and Billingham A (2004) *Third Force Politics: Liberal Democrats at the Grassroots*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Whiteley P, Seyd P and Richardson J (1994) *True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party Membership*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Author biographies

Paul Whiteley is professor of Government at the University of Essex.

Erik Larsen is a lecturer in Political Science at the University of Kent.

Matthew Goodwin is professor of Political Science at the University of Kent and Senior Visiting Fellow at Chatham House, London.

Harold Clarke is Ashbel Smith professor in the School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences at the University of Texas at Dallas, and adjunct professor in the Department of Government at the University of Essex.

Online Appendix

Table of Contents

<i>A. Question Wording and Construction of Scales</i>	<i>1</i>
A.1 Activism Questions.....	1
A.2 The General Incentives Model	3
A.3 The Mobilisation Model	5
A.4 The Micro Relative Deprivation Model	6
A.5 The Revised Relative Deprivation Model.....	6
A.6 Demographics.....	8
<i>B. Robustness test: Accounting for the context of membership</i>	<i>10</i>

A. Question Wording and Construction of Scales

A.1 Activism Questions

Concept	Question wording	Answers
Contact Local Party	Over the last 12 months, how often have you had contact with people active in your local UKIP branch?	Not At All Rarely (once or twice) Occasionally (three to five times) Frequently (more than five times)
Attend Local Party Meetings	Over the last 12 months, how often have you attended a local (e.g., ward or constituency) UKIP meeting?	Not At All Rarely (once or twice) Occasionally (three to five times) Frequently (more than five times)
Overall activity	Overall, how active are you in UKIP?	Not at all active Not very active Fairly active Very active
Attend UKIP local conference	Have you ever attended a local UKIP party conference?	Have attended a local conference Have never attended a local conference
Attend UKIP national/regional Conferences	Have you ever attended a UKIP party conference? [Please tick all that apply]	Have attended a national conference Have attended a regional conference Have never attended a UKIP conference
Hold Office in Party	Do you at present hold any offices in UKIP? (e.g., Branch chairman, treasurer, secretary)	Yes, Branch Chairman Yes, Branch Treasurer, Secretary or Agent Yes, Regional or Local Organizer Yes, Other Office - Please Specify No
Delivered Literature	Have you delivered UKIP literature during an election?	Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently
Helped at Meetings	Have you helped at party functions?	Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently
Canvassed	Have you canvassed voters on behalf of UKIP?	Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently

Displayed Poster	Have you displayed a UKIP poster in a window?	Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently
Donated Money	Have you donated money to UKIP?	Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently
Hours Active between Elections	On average, how many hours a week do you devote to UKIP activities when there is not an election going on?	None 1-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17 or more
Stood for Office	Please indicate if you have done any of the following (tick all that apply)	Stood for office in UKIP (e.g., for the NEC) Stood as a UKIP candidate in a local election Stood as a UKIP candidate in an election for the European Parliament Stood as a UKIP candidate in a general election None of the above
Hours Active during Elections	If you were a member of UKIP at the time of the European Parliament elections in 2014, how many hours a week did you devote to UKIP activities during the EU election campaign?	None 1-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17 or more

A.2 The General Incentives Model

Concept	Question wording	Answers
Weighted Collective Benefits	<p>Using the 0 to 10 scale, where 10 means strongly like, and 0 means strongly dislike, how do you feel about the following political parties:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conservatives - Labour - Liberal Democrats - UKIP 	From 'Strongly dislike' (0) to 'Strongly like' (10)
	Thinking about yourself, on a scale from 0 to 10, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?	From 'No influence' (0) to 'Great deal of influence' (10)
Perceptions of Costs	<p>Here are some statements about political activity in Britain. Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of them:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Attending party meetings can be tiring - Party activity takes a lot of time away from one's family - It takes too much time and effort to be really active in politics and public affairs 	
Civic Duty	<p>Here are some statements about political activity in Britain. Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of them:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Every citizen should get involved in politics if democracy is work properly - I would be seriously neglecting my duty as a citizen if I didn't vote - If someone is dissatisfied with government policies, he or she has a duty to get active in politics - If UKIP is going to be successful, every party member must contribute as much as they can. 	<p>Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree</p>

Political Ambitions	<p>Here are some statements about political activity in Britain. Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of them:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A person like me could do a good job of being a local UKIP councillor - I would like to run for parliament some day. 	<p>Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree</p>
Social Norms	<p>How interested are you in having a career in politics?</p> <p>Here are some statements about political activity in Britain. Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of them:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Most of my family and friends think that working for a party is a waste of time 	<p>Very interested Somewhat interested Not very interested Not at all interested Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree</p>
Ideology	<p>In politics, people sometimes talk about 'left' and 'right' when describing parties, leaders, or political ideas. Using the scale below, where would you put yourself?</p>	<p>From "Left" (0) to "Right" (10)</p>
Social Network Motivation	<p>Here are some statements about political activity in Britain. Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of them:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Being an active party member is a good way to meet interesting people - Getting involved in party activities can be fun - Being a party member is a good way to learn about politics - Being a UKIP party member can help people like me in their business careers - If UKIP members work together they can really change Britain 	<p>Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree</p>

A.3 The Mobilisation Model

Concept		Question wording	Answers
Evaluations of Farage		Using the 0-10 scale, where 10 means strongly like and 0 means strongly dislike, how do you feel about Nigel Farage	From "Strongly dislike" (0) to "Strongly like" (10)
Social Recruitment	Network	Thinking back to when you joined UKIP, how did you join?	I joined after a friend or family member introduced me to the party I joined some other way
Attention to Politics		On a scale from 0 to 10, how much attention do you pay to politics and public affairs?	From "Pay no attention to politics" (0) to "Pay great deal of attention" (10)
Parents Active	Politically	Were either your father or mother actively involved in politics? (please tick all that apply)	Father was active Mother was active Neither parent was active in politics
Past Membership	Party	Before becoming a member of UKIP, were you ever a member of another party or parties?	No Yes
Social Motivation	Network	Here are some statements about political activity in Britain. Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of them: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Being an active party member is a good way to meet interesting people - Getting involved in party activities can be fun - Being a party member is a good way to learn about politics - Being a UKIP party member can help people like me in their business careers - If UKIP members work together they can really change Britain 	Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree

A.4 The Micro Relative Deprivation Model

Concept	Question wording	Answers
Left Behind	Perceptions of household financial situation minus perceptions of national economic performance over the last 12 months	
Micro Relative Deprivation	<p>Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following statements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There is often a big gap between what people like yourself expect out of life and what you actually get. - The Government generally treats people like yourself fairly. 	<p>Strongly agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree</p>

A.5 The Revised Relative Deprivation Model

Concept	Question wording	Answers
Democratic Dissatisfaction	Thinking about how well democracy works in this country, on the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way that democracy works in this country?	<p>Very satisfied Fairly satisfied A little dissatisfied Very dissatisfied</p>
Anti-Elitist Perceptions	<p>Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following statements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic inequality is a major problem in Britain - Social injustice is a major problem in Britain - Corporate greed is a major problem in Britain - British banks are making excessive profits at the expense of ordinary people 	<p>Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree</p>
Economic Evaluations	How do you think the financial situation of your household will change over the next 12 months?	<p>Get a lot better Get a little better Stay the same Get a little worse Get a lot worse</p>
	How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months?	<p>Got a lot better Got a little better Stay the same Got a little worse Got a lot worse</p>

		How do you think the general economic situation in this country will develop over the next 12 months?	Get a lot better Get a little better Stay the same Get a little worse Get a lot worse
		How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago? Has it:	Got a lot better Got a little better Stay the same Got a little worse Got a lot worse
Dissatisfaction with the EU	with	Overall, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of Britain's membership in the European Union?	Strongly approve Approve Disapprove Strongly disapprove
Dissatisfaction with Immigration	with	Respondents who think immigration is the most important issue facing the country.	
		Do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain these days is:	A lot better A little better The same A little worse A lot worse
		Which of the following statements comes closest to your view?	Britain should increase the number of immigrants coming to the country The current number of immigrants coming to Britain is about right. Britain should reduce the number of immigrants coming to the country Britain should stop all immigration to the country
		How well do you think the present government has handled the number of immigrants coming to Britain?	Very well Fairly well Neither well nor badly Fairly badly Very badly
		Respondents who say that immigration into Britain makes them feel angry, disgusted or uneasy.	
		Using the 0-10 scale, how important a problem is the number of	From "Not at all important" (0) to "Very important" (10)

immigrants coming to Britain these days?

A.6 Demographics

Concept	Question wording	Answers
Age	What is your age group?	25 or younger 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66 or older
Male	What is your gender?	Man Woman
Education	What is your highest educational qualification?	No formal qualifications Youth training certificate/skillseekers Recognised trade apprenticeship completed Clerical and commercial City and Guild certificate City and Guild certificate - advanced ONC CSE grades 2-5 CSE grade 1, GCE O level, GCSE, School Certificate Scottish Ordinary/ Lower Certificate GCE A level or Higher Certificate Scottish Higher Certificate Nursing qualification (eg SEN, SRN, SCM, RGN) Teaching qualification (not degree) University diploma University or CNAA first degree (eg BA, B.Sc, B.Ed) University or CNAA higher degree (eg M.Sc, Ph.D) Other technical, professional or higher qualification
Income	What is your annual household income?	Less than £19,999 £20,000 to £29,999 £30,000 to £39,999 £40,000 to £49,999 £50,000 to £69,999 £70,000 to £99,999 £100,000 to £149,999

£150,000 or more

B. Robustness test: Accounting for the context of membership**Table B.1:** Rival Models of the Combined Party Activism Scale in UKIP, Context Controls

	Relative deprivation	Mobilization	General Incentives	Composite Model
Age	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)
Male	-0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Education	0.08*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
Income	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Economic Evaluations	-0.15*** (0.02)			-0.11*** (0.02)
Left Behind	-0.07*** (0.01)			-0.03*** (0.01)
Democracy Dissatisfaction	0.003 (0.02)			-0.002 (0.02)
Relative Deprivation	0.03*** (0.01)			-0.04*** (0.01)
Anti-Elitist Perceptions	0.06*** (0.02)			-0.05*** (0.02)
Social Network Recruitment		0.83*** (0.06)		0.71*** (0.05)
Attention to Politics		0.18*** (0.01)		0.05*** (0.01)
Social Network Motivations		0.41*** (0.02)		0.39*** (0.01)
Parents Politically Active		0.03* (0.02)		-0.01 (0.02)
Party Member in Past		0.23*** (0.03)		0.12*** (0.03)
Weighted Collective Benefits			0.003*** (0.0001)	0.002*** (0.0001)
Perception of Costs			-0.21*** (0.01)	-0.22*** (0.01)
Civic Duty			0.05*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Political Ambitions			0.59*** (0.02)	0.60*** (0.02)
Social Norms			0.13*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)
Dissatisfaction with the EU			0.22*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
Immigration Dissatisfaction			0.07*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Left-Right Ideology			0.10*** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)
Ideology Squared			-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)
Evaluations of Farage			-0.01 (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Member: 2013-2014	0.70*** (0.05)	0.68*** (0.05)	0.67*** (0.04)	0.67*** (0.04)
Member: 2010-2013	1.05*** (0.04)	1.00*** (0.04)	1.00*** (0.04)	1.00*** (0.04)
Member: 2005-2010	1.46*** (0.06)	1.35*** (0.06)	1.42*** (0.05)	1.36*** (0.05)
Member: 2001-2004	1.73*** (0.07)	1.62*** (0.07)	1.68*** (0.06)	1.62*** (0.06)
Member: Before 2001	2.01*** (0.08)	1.86*** (0.07)	1.94*** (0.07)	1.85*** (0.07)

Constant	-0.56*** (0.13)	-2.11*** (0.11)	-2.67*** (0.21)	-2.25*** (0.23)
AIC	47262.36	46095.99	43833.02	42786.68
Observations	12,114	12,114	12,114	12,114
R ²	0.12	0.20	0.34	0.39

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The baseline category for membership is since the European Parliament elections in May 2014.

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table B.2: Composite Models of the Latent Activism Measures, Context Controls

	Political Support	Political Activism	High Intensity Activism
Age	0.04*** (0.003)	0.06*** (0.005)	0.03*** (0.005)
Male	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Education	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Income	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.02*** (0.004)
<i>Relative Deprivation</i>			
Economic Evaluations	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Left Behind	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.02*** (0.003)
Democracy Dissatisfaction	-0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Relative Deprivation	-0.01** (0.002)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.01*** (0.004)
Anti-Elitist Perceptions	-0.01** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
<i>Mobilization</i>			
Social Network Recruitment	0.16*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.02)
Attention to Politics	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.004)	0.02*** (0.004)
Social Network Motivations	0.09*** (0.003)	0.15*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)
Parents Politically Active	0.0002 (0.004)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Party Member in Past	0.02*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
<i>General Incentives</i>			
Weighted Collective Benefits	0.0004*** (0.0000)	0.001*** (0.0000)	0.001*** (0.0000)
Perception of Costs	-0.04*** (0.003)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Civic Duty	0.03*** (0.003)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Political Ambitions	0.12*** (0.004)	0.23*** (0.01)	0.25*** (0.01)
Social Norms	0.02*** (0.004)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Dissatisfaction with the EU	0.05*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Immigration Dissatisfaction	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Left-Right Ideology	0.01 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)
Ideology Squared	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.001)
Evaluations of Farage	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.03*** (0.004)

Member: 2013-2014	0.19*** (0.01)	0.25*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.02)
Member: 2010-2013	0.28*** (0.01)	0.36*** (0.01)	0.35*** (0.02)
Member: 2005-2010	0.40*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.02)
Member: 2001-2004	0.46*** (0.01)	0.60*** (0.02)	0.55*** (0.03)
Member: Before 2001	0.53*** (0.02)	0.68*** (0.03)	0.64*** (0.03)
Constant	-0.70*** (0.06)	-0.76*** (0.09)	-0.79*** (0.10)
AIC	8348.62	20434.2	22832.22
Observations	12,114	12,114	12,114
R ²	0.38	0.35	0.36

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The baseline category for membership is since the European Parliament elections in May 2014.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.