

Direct and Indirect Welfare Chauvinism as Party Strategies: An Analysis of the Danish People's Party

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This article develops a theoretical distinction between direct and indirect welfare chauvinism in order to analyze how electorally successful populist right-wing parties transmit social policy preferences with significant redistributive implications for the shape of the welfare state. Direct welfare chauvinism occurs as a result of legislative changes that explicitly exclude recipients from social protection or reduce the level thereof on the basis of ethnicity. Indirect welfare chauvinism is the result of policy measures that apply to both natives and immigrants, but which deliberately negatively affect immigrants the most. Combining quantitative and qualitative analysis of labour market reforms in Denmark, where one of the most successful populist right-wing parties in Europe – the Danish People's Party – held a pivotal position in the period 2001–11, the article traces the intentions and deliberate policy-making strategies of the party. It shows that the distinction between direct and indirect chauvinism is a useful theoretical tool for understanding how the Danish People's Party can fulfill the expectations of both its electorate and its coalition partners, even if they point in different directions.

Introduction

The populist right-wing (hereafter PRW) is arguably the most successful new party family in Western Europe (Kitchelt 2007; Mudde 2013). From around one-tenth of the votes in the early 1990s, the average seat-share of these parties in the parliaments of Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway had jumped to 17 percent in 2013 (Afonso 2015). While these parties previously were on the fringe of the party system thriving electorally on issue-entrepreneurship to upset existing structures of party competition (De Vries & Hobolt 2012), some of them recently became junior coalition partners for governments and/or pivotal for the formation of parliamentary majorities. Importantly, the policy focus of PRW parties is no longer restricted to niche issues, such as immigration. Socioeconomic issues, and particularly the politics of welfare

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state reform, are important battlegrounds for these parties in contemporary Europe (Afonso 2015).

This article explores whether, and especially how, PRW parties affect the welfare state and leave a distinct partisan imprint on social policy. Only few studies have analyzed the strategies of these parties to achieve policy influence and reach their policy goals. These studies, for good reasons, focused especially on immigration policy (Schain 2006; Akkerman 2010; Van Spanje 2010; Bolin et al. 2014) and multiculturalism (Han 2015), and found that PRW parties have restrictive effects. This finding is unsurprising, given that these policies touch the parties' core programmatic issues and affect a well-defined target group. The question is whether PRW parties are equally successful when it comes to policies which, in principle, apply to much larger groups, such as redistributive measures.

The preferences of PRW parties regarding redistribution combine a strong pro-welfare state position with explicit exclusion of non-natives (i.e., immigrants and refugees). This particular combination, which enables PRW parties to occupy a traditional social-democratic or left-wing ideological space on the socioeconomic dimension while maintaining their anti-immigration right-wing position on the sociocultural dimension, is conceptualized as *welfare chauvinism* (Bjørklund & Andersen 2002; De Koster et al. 2013). In its most restrictive form, 'welfare chauvinism' can be defined as a system of collective social protection that is restricted to those belonging to the ethnically defined community who has contributed to it (Kitchelt 2007).

The impact of party politics on welfare policies is well-proven (Korpi & Palme 2003; Jensen 2012; Klitgaard & Elmelund-Præstekær 2013). Given that the recent electoral achievements of PRW parties have strengthened their bargaining power in the policy-making process (Afonso 2015), it is likely that the presence of a powerful PRW party in this process leads to alterations of social policies in a welfare chauvinistic direction. We qualify, however, this expectation on the basis of a theoretical distinction between *direct* welfare chauvinism, where the policy measures negatively and directly affect immigrants, and *indirect welfare chauvinism*, where policy measures are directed to larger target groups, but negatively affect immigrants to a larger extent (Emmenegger & Careja 2012). Using the example of Denmark, where the Danish People's Party electoral strength has turned it into the main parliamentary support party for the government in the first decade of the 2000s, we have ideal conditions for observing the strategies through which a PRW party transposes welfare chauvinistic preferences into policies.

We begin by elaborating on the theoretical distinction between direct and indirect welfare chauvinism, and explaining why welfare chauvinism

most likely occurs in the latter form. We then move on to analyze labour market-related welfare legislation in Denmark in three steps. First, we analyze the extent to which direct welfare chauvinism was adopted in labour market legislation over a period of 35 years. Second, we study all major labor market reforms in the 2000s, when the Danish People's Party had ideal opportunities to consistently pursue its welfare state preferences. Finally, we engage in an in-depth analysis of one strategically selected reform to examine the theorized link between PRW parties' preferences and the content of social policy.

The Policy Effects of Populist Right-wing Parties

PRW parties undoubtedly reshape the party spectrum (Jungar & Jupskås 2014). Traditionally, they have been niche parties on the fringe of the party systems (Wagner 2012), thriving especially on the advancement of tough immigration policies. However, more recently, they have benefitted electorally from globalization anxiety, and promoted the idea that national welfare states are meant to protect the population against the heightened risks brought about by internationalization. Breeding on a more general cultural argument against multiculturalism (Bjørklund & Andersen 2002; Schumacher & Van Kersbergen 2014), their views on immigration and redistribution condense into a particular notion of deservingness: those deserving the protection of the welfare states are only the members of the national ethnic community.

Thus, what sets PRW parties apart from other parties is that in the domain of social welfare policy they propose an apparently fractured discourse, proclaiming support for generous access to welfare benefits while simultaneously arguing that access to these benefits should be limited to the members of the native ethnic community, thereby excluding immigrants, refugees and other 'foreign' individuals. This combination of anti-immigrant attitudes and leftist positions on welfare issues, typical for modern anti-immigrant parties, is known as '*welfare chauvinism*' (Hainsworth 2000; Mudde 2000; Andersen 2007).

Consequently, a crucial question is whether PRW parties are successful in using their electoral strength and, in some cases, pivotal parliamentary position to translate these welfare chauvinistic preferences into public policy. Numerous studies have documented partisan effects on welfare state reforms (Korpi & Palme 2003; Allan & Scruggs 2004; Jensen 2012; Klitgaard & Elmelund-Præstekær 2013). Social democrats and other left-leaning parties cater to the interests of people in the lower income brackets by 'taxing and spending more', whereas right-wing governments respond to upscale groups by 'taxing and spending less' (Cusack & Beramendi 2006).

These findings suggest that, if included in the policy-making process, the PRW parties might have a venue in which to shape policies.

However, their task is not straightforward because they promote policies where the sociocultural dimension intersects with socioeconomic issues (Häusermann 2010). One major consequence is that they attract working-class voters, to whom they appeal with a discourse combining social protection with traditionalist-authoritarian values (Häusermann et al. 2013). As Afonso (2015) argues, as PRW parties cater to voters with left-leaning redistributive preferences, but find themselves in coalitions with pro-retrenchment right-leaning parties, they are often in a position where they either must betray their electorate in order to retain office or they must betray their coalition partners to remain true to their electoral promises.

Political parties can pursue different strategies in order to shape public policy outcomes. Thus, to understand whether PRW parties are successful in transferring their welfare chauvinistic preferences into policies, we need to clarify which strategies they may use. We propose that PRW parties rely on either *direct* or *indirect* strategies when they seek to cut off immigrants from social protection. The direct strategy would entail implementation of exclusionary principles targeting immigrants in policy measures. An example of such direct welfare chauvinism would be exclusion of immigrants from social assistance benefits. The indirect strategy, by contrast, aims to affect a specific target group through measures which apply to all, or at least broader categories of beneficiaries. This strategy utilizes the fact that one or more specific groups might be more affected because they are over-represented as benefit claimants of a social programme. Indirect welfare chauvinism can occur in two situations: (a) when benefits are retrenched, or (b) when benefits are conditioned. In both situations, the rules apply to all potential beneficiaries (both immigrants and natives), but immigrants are negatively affected because in situation (a) they rely more than natives on the retrenched benefits or, in situation (b) they have difficulties in fulfilling the conditions. An example of the first situation would be a reduction in the family benefit: it would affect all families with children, but it would hit immigrant families harder simply because they tend to have more children than native families. An example of the second situation would be conditioning a benefit on certain numbers of hours worked per year: both natives and immigrants would have to fulfill this condition, but it is more difficult for immigrants to find employment.

Welfare Chauvinism as Partisan Politics

PRW parties have gained noticeable foothold in several European legislatures during the 1990s and 2000s, and in several instances became part of

governments or served as the base of parliamentary support for minority governments (Minkenberg 2007; Heinisch 2010; Afonso 2015). They have thus moved closer to the core of political systems across Europe, which likely translates into policy effects. Some studies document a link between the electoral achievements of PRW parties and the adoption of more restrictive immigration policies as well as a general right-turn in sociocultural policies (Minkenberg 2007; Akkerman 2010). Thus the electoral and parliamentary strength of PRW parties may turn social policy in a welfare chauvinistic direction. This is likely to be especially true in the recent period characterized by renewed concern with sociodemographic challenges to the welfare state, amid sluggish economic performance and strong economic crisis. Such a context seems ideally suited for PRW parties' welfare chauvinistic preferences, which present a simple solution: limit expenditures by targeted retrenchment cutting non-natives from welfare services and benefits. Thus, it is likely that that in countries where PRW parties have gained electoral strength and are in a privileged position to negotiate with the government, welfare state retrenchment will reflect their welfare chauvinistic preferences. In other words, policies would contain *direct* welfare chauvinistic measures.

However, although PRW anti-immigration preferences are clearly visible in tightening the control of the immigrants' inflow, we argue that several factors impede PRW parties in directly transposing their welfare chauvinistic preferences into social policy measures. First, the antidiscrimination laws in Western democracies prohibit discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and/or nationality (Emmenegger & Careja 2012). This prevents policy measures that intentionally restrict the admission of specific groups, such as immigrants, to social benefits. Second, party politics is shaped by electoral rules. In majoritarian electoral systems it is difficult for PRW parties to muster the large scale support that would earn them parliamentary majorities, and thus access to government. They are more likely to achieve their goals in proportional systems, which allow smaller parties to obtain a pivotal position, become part of coalition governments or serve as the base for parliamentary majorities. In this situation, PRW parties must negotiate their preferences with mainstream parties, which have their own electorates whose preferences which need to be respected and reflected in policies.

Although recent studies have identified a rapprochement of mainstream parties to welfare chauvinistic arguments (see De Lange 2012; Schumacher & Van Kersbergen 2014), it is unlikely that a mainstream party would subscribe to welfare chauvinism to the extent advocated by PRW parties as it might alienate part of its electorate whose views are not exclusionary toward immigrants. Moreover, mainstream parties are also keen to avoid a move too close to a PRW position because it may be seen as

legitimizing the populist discourse. Therefore, mainstream parties, even on the right, may be reluctant to accept a social policy that *directly* reflects welfare chauvinist preferences. The Swedish case is an extreme and illustrative example: in 2014, parliamentary majority was won by a coalition of right-of-centre parties, but the incumbent centre-right prime minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, refused to collaborate with the PRW party (the Swedish Democrats). With the Swedish Democrats out of the equation, the left-wing coalition commanded a majority and the Social Democrats took office (Aylott & Bolin 2015). Given the above constraints, our first hypothesis is that, even if PRW parties are electorally strong, hold a favourable bargaining position in parliament and have welfare chauvinistic preferences figuring prominently on their campaign agenda, *direct* welfare chauvinism at the social policy level is not likely to occur (*H1*).

Still, there is evidence indicating implementation of welfare chauvinistic preferences. Pre-EU-enlargement reforms adopted in some of the old European Union member states echoed PRW parties' arguments that migrants from the new member states were in fact welfare tourists and should not be granted access to benefits (Kvist 2004; Klitgaard & Roederer-Rynning 2009). Schumacher and Van Kersbergen (2014) show that mainstream parties are likely to adapt to populist parties on some welfare chauvinistic positions. Moreover, Emmenegger & Careja (2012) and Careja et al. (2015) have documented many instances of policy changes that arguably echo the basic tenet of welfare chauvinism, as they limit the access of non-natives. Therefore, our second hypothesis states that, due to constraints outlined above, PRW parties pursue policy measures in which welfare chauvinism materializes *indirectly* as cutbacks or conditions in programmes where migrants are over-represented among benefit claimants (*H2*).

If instances of indirect welfare chauvinism can be identified in the case of welfare policy changes, the question remains whether they can be attributed to the deliberate strategies of PRW parties. In order to investigate the proposed link between the PRW parties' policy preferences and the existence of indirect welfare chauvinism, we derive three observable implications of our theoretical argument: First, we expect that PRW parties – at least in part – engage in political negotiations *because* they want to follow through on welfare chauvinistic preferences (*H2a*). Since the constituency of PRW parties strongly adheres to an anti-immigrant and pro-welfare state stance, welfare chauvinism is a likely vote-winning strategy for these parties. Thus, and second, we expect to observe that PRW parties claim credit once a policy change has been adopted by communicating that the adopted measures reflect the party's electoral promise to limit the public money spent on (undeserving) non-natives (*H2b*). And finally, we expect PRW parties to be the *only* parties to claim credit this

way, and therefore we expect to observe a difference between the PRW parties and their policy coalition partners in the way social policy reforms are communicated (*H2c*).

Method and Data

Our hypotheses are examined empirically in a study of one of the most successful PRW parties in Europe – the Danish People’s Party (DPP hereafter) – and legislation that is very susceptible to welfare chauvinistic arguments. In other words, the DPP and Denmark provide us with a case in which we have very good conditions for observing the strategy of a PRW party when it tries to transpose welfare chauvinistic preferences into policies.

Founded in 1995 as a splinter party of the Progress Party (Rydgren 2004), the DPP had a breakthrough in the 2001 general election where it gained 12 percent of the vote and became the third largest party in the Danish parliament. More importantly, after the 2001 election, it also won the pivotal position in the Danish party system, and thus served as parliamentary base of support for a right-wing government until 2011. In the 2015 general election, the party captured 21 percent of the votes, gained 15 extra seats, became the second largest party and once again became an important parliamentary support party for the incoming right-wing government. As immigration and welfare state issues have been riding high on the political agenda ever since 2001, the DPP has had good opportunities to advance welfare chauvinistic policies and thus leave a partisan imprint on the welfare state (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen 2014). Few, if any, PRW parties in Europe have held a comparable position and had equally favourable conditions to influence the government.

We study labour market-related reforms because partisan effects have been shown to be stronger in this field than in other policy domains (Jensen 2012; Klitgaard & Elmelund-Præstekær 2013). Moreover, labor market-cum-welfare state reforms are likely to be sensitive to welfare chauvinistic arguments as they evolve around the question of ‘who gets what, when and how’, and trigger the question of the deservingness of different groups (Van Oorschot 2000).

Our theoretical innovation is the distinction between direct and indirect welfare chauvinism, and the argument that, if direct welfare chauvinism measures are difficult to implement as such due to exogenous constraints, indirect welfare chauvinism is a feasible option for PRW parties. In order to study whether and how a PRW party may seek to promote welfare chauvinism indirectly, we study the policy processes in which the DPP participated. The DPP had considerable influence on government policy for a decade and it was occasionally involved in pre-reform negotiations

where deals were cut before anything formally reached the parliament (Christiansen & Klitgaard 2010). Thus, the Danish case is crucial for our argument, in that it allows us to observe whether the theoretical expectations are observable in practice. This allows us to trace the strategies through which the DPP successfully translates its welfare chauvinistic preferences into social policies.

Researching the Dependent Variable

The first part of the empirical study addresses the possible existence of direct welfare chauvinism in all adopted legislation (individual laws) originating from the Ministry of Labour over the period 1975–2011. The analyzed data holds information about labour market policy in a broad sense, including issues such as the conditions to access and leave the labour market, eligibility for income compensating benefits, rights and responsibility of the individual to participate in active labour market policy programmes, benefit generosity and so on. A portfolio of 366 labour market laws was manually coded. For each law, we coded whether it intended to expand or retrench the welfare state and if it was targeting a specific group (see Online Appendix A for an explanation of the coding procedure, definitions and coding examples).

Research on partisan effects in welfare state legislation focuses on measuring policy outcomes (Korpi & Palme 2003; Allan & Scruggs 2004; Jensen 2012). These studies have documented a *correlation* between the ideological orientation of governments and the size of the welfare state. However, we take a different approach and analyze the *content* of the legislation of interest, which will allow us to observe whether the laws retrench or not, and which group is initially targeted. Proceeding this way our data is not contaminated with the effects of processes that take place in the implementation phase, when policies may be modified or even thwarted (Moe 1990; Weaver & Rockman 1993; Hacker 2004).

The second part of the empirical study addresses the hypothesis that welfare chauvinism takes indirect forms. To this end, we perform a qualitative analysis of all major labour market reforms executed in Denmark during the period where the DPP enjoyed *de facto* incumbency status as it ensured the parliamentary support for the right-wing government (i.e., 2001–11). The studied reforms are selected from all political agreements negotiated within the portfolio of the Ministry of Employment (see <http://bm.dk/da/Aktuelt/Politiske%20aftaler.aspx>). The list includes 33 agreements, most of which are minor policy adjustments or institutional/administrative issues. After excluding such items, we arrive at a list of seven significant political agreements with substantial policy content to be

Table 1. Overview of the Seven Labour Market Reforms and the Parties' Support for the Agreements

Reform/Party	Red/Green Alliance	Socialist People's Party	Social Democrats	Social Liberals	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Conservatives	Danish People's party	Liberal Alliance
2002: More People into Work	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
2005: A New Chance for Everybody*	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■
2006: The Welfare Agreement	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■
2006: Future Immigration	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■
2010: The Restoration Package**	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■
2010: 29 Measures to Combat Benefit Fraud***	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
2011: Higher Ambitions	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■

Notes: Black = support for agreement; grey = no support for agreement; blank = party not represented in parliament. *The Social Democrats abstained from voting in parliament. **Liberal Alliance supported some parts of the reform in the parliament. ***Social Democrats, Socialist People's Party and Liberal Alliance abstained from voting in parliament.

analyzed. Table 1 provides an overview of the reforms and the party composition of the reform coalitions.

To test *H2*, we examine any possible indication of indirect welfare chauvinism by analyzing each reform in turn. For this purpose, we rely on official government documents (for detailed presentations of the reforms, see Online Appendix D). However, even if the analysis of all reforms reveals significant signs of indirect welfare chauvinism, it is not enough to establish a relationship between the preferences of the DPP and the occurrence of welfare chauvinism. To investigate this linkage as captured by *H2a–H2c*, we undertake a detailed analysis of the communication around the reforms. The argument that we develop here – that a political party feeds distinct preferences into the policy-making process – needs a link between *a priory* party preferences and adopted policies (Klitgaard & Elmelund-Præstekær 2013). We analyze expressed preferences, strategies and the behaviour of the DPP, addressing the following questions: Does the party express welfare chauvinistic preferences? Does it claim credit for the existence of indirect welfare chauvinism by presenting indirect measures as deliberate attempts to deprive foreigners of public benefits? And is the DPP the only party that expresses welfare chauvinistic preferences and claim credit for indirect welfare chauvinistic measures?


To explore the reasons and the position of the DPP in reform negotiations, we analyze news coverage *during* the negotiation period, beginning with the presentation of the reform proposal by the government and ending with the reaching of an agreement. To explore the parties' framing of the final reform, we analyze news coverage one week *after* the presentation of the reform agreements. The analyses are based on two encompassing media searches for newspaper articles related to the reforms of interest in eight Danish outlets (*Politiken*, *Jyllands-Posten*, *Berlingske*, *Information*, *Ekstra Bladet*, *B.T.*, *Børsen* and *Kristeligt Dagblad*) via the Infomedia database. All search periods and search terms are reported in Online Appendix C.

The final step in the empirical analysis is an in-depth analysis of the arguably most significant and controversial reform among those that are listed in Table 1: the 2006 Welfare Agreement (Klitgaard & Nørgaard 2009). Mapping out the communication of parties' preferences juxtaposed to the reform content allows us to establish the theorized causal link between party preferences, party strategy and observed policy change.

Direct Welfare Chauvinism in Danish Labour Market Legislation

A total of 39 (10 percent of all coded) laws explicitly targeted specific groups, such as elderly, disabled, young, immigrants, women or the long-

Figure 1. Number of Labour Market Laws that Target Specific Groups.



term unemployed (see Figure 1). Most of the targeted laws expanded welfare programmes (33 in total), while only few target retrenched programs (six in total).

To examine whether targeted laws are systematically more likely to be retrenchments than the non-targeted ones, we estimate the propensity that a given law is a retrenchment. Table 2 shows three logistic regression models (see Online Appendix B for descriptive information on the included variables). The models are estimated on the pooled data, but show identical results when estimated with a random intercept by year. First, model 1 tests the classical explanation that retrenchment depends on the ideological stance of the government. We find that right-wing governments retrench more than left-wing governments. Substantially, the probability of retrenchment increases from 22 to 32 percent going from a left-wing government to a right-wing government. This finding is in line

Table 2. Retrenchments in Danish Labour Market Policy, 1975–2010, Logistic Regression

	Model 1 Government retrenchment	Model 2 Target group retrenchment	Model 3 Full model
Right-wing government	0.49** (0.24)		0.52** (0.24)
Target group		-0.81* (0.46)	-0.87* (0.46)
Constant	-1.22*** (0.17)	-0.89*** (0.12)	-1.15*** (0.18)
Log likelihood	-213.45	-213.80	-211.40
Pseudo R ²	0.01	0.01	0.02
N	366	366	366

Notes: Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Baseline for right-wing government: left-wing governments. Baseline for target group: universal. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

with, and replicates earlier results that partisan politics matters for welfare state retrenchment.

Model 2 includes specific target groups. The baseline category is universal laws (i.e., laws formulated in general terms with no reference to specific groups). Interestingly, we find that laws that are formulated with reference to a specific group are *less* likely to be retrenchments than universally formulated laws ($p < 0.1$). Substantially, the probability that a law is a retrenchment decreases from 29 percent in universal laws to 15 percent in targeted ones. The small number of targeted laws renders it impossible to run meaningful statistical analyses on the group level, but we can conclude that group targeting most often expands the entitlements of the targeted group – that is, the practice of targeting signifies affirmative action rather than discrimination.

Model 3 combines the two first models and shows identical results: over the period of interest, the odds of observing retrenchment increase when a right-wing government is in power and decrease when the law targets a specific group.¹ However, a closer look at the distribution of the laws suggests a nuanced picture: among the six instances which retrenched welfare benefits, two explicitly targeted immigrants (i.e., they are cases of direct welfare chauvinism). Over the entire period of interest, we do not find systematic evidence for direct welfare chauvinism: the instances of retrenchment were rare, and immigrants were explicitly aimed at in two instances of targeted retrenchment. This may suggest that the policy negotiation process is not always enough to filter out policy positions against immigrants.

Indirect Welfare Chauvinism in Danish Labour Market Reforms

To test the second hypothesis, we empirically examine indirect welfare chauvinism in Denmark in the first decade of the 2000s, where the DPP hold a powerful position. A first step is to analyze the content of policy change during the period in order to identify instances of indirect welfare chauvinism. In connection with this we evaluate *H2b* and *H2c* by mapping out the policy positions taken by the DPP and its communicative efforts, and compare that communication to that of other parties. In the second step, we present an analysis of the DPP's strategy and behaviour in relation to one reform to see if we can trace welfare chauvinism back to the preferences, intentions and strategy of this particular party, as *H2a* expected. Table 3 summarizes the detailed analysis of all reforms, which can be found in the Online Appendix D, and indicates whether or not the reforms included elements of direct and/or indirect welfare chauvinism.

Six of the seven reforms contained either direct or indirect welfare chauvinist elements. Five reforms retrenched or tightened the conditions of

Table 3. Direct and Indirect Welfare Chauvinism in the Policy Content of Danish Labour Market Reforms

Reform	Content of reform	Welfare chauvinism?	
		Direct	Indirect
2002: More People into Work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ceiling on social assistance benefits • Reduction in social assistance benefits for people under the age of 25 years • Unemployed must accept jobs at a distance 	No: Initiatives applies to all	Yes: Immigrants are disproportionately affected
2005: A New Chance for Everybody	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15–18 year-olds without secondary education cut off from social assistance benefits • Family allowances to 15–17 year-olds conditional on school attendance • All unemployed obliged to participate in active labour market programmes • Mutual provision within married couples 	No: Initiatives applies to all	Yes: Immigrants are disproportionately affected
2006: Welfare Agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Higher pension age (up from 65 to 67 years) • Later early retirement age (up from 60 to 62 years) • Automatic indexing of pension age according to average life expectancy 	No: Initiatives applies to all	No: Immigrants are not disproportionately affected
2006: Future Immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tighten eligibility criteria for early retirement • Access to social assistance benefits conditional on an 'integration examination' 	Yes: Initiatives apply to non-Western immigrants	No: –
2010: Restoration Package	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ceiling on family allowances approx. €4,000 per year. • Full public pension requires 40 years of permanent residency in Denmark 	No: Initiatives applies to all	Yes: Immigrants are disproportionately affected
2010: 29 Measures to Combat Fraud	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stricter control of recipients living abroad • Stronger administrative check for alternative income of receivers of social assistance benefits and start-help • Stronger collaboration and data-sharing between local and national government 	No: Initiatives applies to all	Yes: Immigrants are disproportionately affected

Table 3. *Continued*

Reform	Content of reform	Welfare chauvinism?	
		Direct	Indirect
2011: Higher Ambitions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focused effort in socially disadvantaged residential areas • Encouragement of local authorities to file criminal cases against frauds • Internships for recipients of the introductory benefit and the start-help benefit. • Wage subsidies for immigrants • Economic sanctions when abstaining from mandatory activation 	<p>No: Retrenchment initiatives applies to all</p>	<p>Yes: Immigrants are disproportionately affected</p>

welfare benefits resulting in non-native being over-represented among the negatively affected benefit claimants, which is indicative of indirect welfare chauvinism. Most reforms affected the social assistance scheme – a move which likely reflected the knowledge that immigrants depend on these schemes. Indeed, preceding the *More People into Work* reform, and as an attempt to spark of the debate about it, the government released a report about the profiles of social benefit claimants showing that non-Western immigrants are strongly over-represented among those who receive social assistance benefits (Government of Denmark 2002). Only one reform – the *Welfare Agreement* – retrenched programmes with a more universal profile (i.e., public pensions and the early retirement scheme). Interestingly, this reform did not contain any kind of welfare chauvinistic measures, but, as we show below, this was due to a special arrangement negotiated by the DPP.

As expected by *H2b* and *H2c*, we observe that the DPP deliberately claimed credit for welfare chauvinistic policy changes by associating its participation in the reform coalitions with a preference for excluding immigrants from social protection. First, the party communicated consistently the welfare chauvinistic aspects of the reforms. The second column of Table 4 provides statements made by party officials and spokespersons portraying non-natives as an economic burden whose accessibility to welfare benefits should be reduced (see Online Appendix D for details). In addition, the party openly called for discriminating between native Danes and different groups of non-natives. Its vice-chairman's endorsement of the *Higher Ambition* initiative is an illustrative example: 'The proposal is exactly as we wanted it: It applies to all, but the majority of those who will be affected are non-Western immigrants and descendants' (*Politiken*, 28 May 2011).

Second, the DPP's communication is distinctly different from that of other parties. The government legitimized reforms on economic grounds, to reduce the public deficit, and prevent a long-term labour deficit problem. The government never engaged in the welfare chauvinistic discourse nurtured by the DPP, and on occasions, explicitly denied any welfare chauvinistic aspirations. For example, confronted with the statement that a new ceiling on child benefits was designed to affect particularly immigrant families, the Minister of Taxation replied that 'the government has no such ambition' (*Jyllands-Posten*, 29 May 2010). Consistent with *H2c*, we conclude that the DPP was the only actor claiming credit for the welfare chauvinistic aspects of the reforms.

Indirect Welfare Chauvinism as Political Strategy

The empirical examination of the hypothesis that welfare chauvinism is an artifact of the DPP's preferences (*H2a*) is crucial to substantiate our central argument. The empirical implication is that policy reforms are welfare

Table 4. Examples of Danish People's Party's and the Government's Dominant Communication Strategies about Danish Labour Market Reforms

Reform	Danish People's Party	Government/Other coalition parties
2002: More People into Work	<p>'It's true that this hits hard on the huge Somali family living in a big apartment. But that is exactly the purpose because it should prompt one of the parents to seek a job.'</p> <p>'The numbers show that especially immigrants suck money out of the social assistance system. It verges on abuse.'</p> <p>'Denmark is not a grab bag of public benefits.'</p>	<p>'It's not beneficial for a large group of people to get a job. They have more money as social assistance claimants than they [...] would earn from a low paid job.'</p>
2005: A New Chance for Everybody		<p>'We aim to do the utmost to help [immigrants] to gain a foothold in Danish society, have a job and learn the language.'</p>
2006: Welfare Agreement/Future Immigration	<p>'We need to look at the possibilities to tighten the rules for foreigners who cost Denmark very, very large sums of money.'</p>	<p>'It is an opportunity to learn something about one's future country of residence even before the arrival. The language requirements will be minimal and illiterates will be able to pass it.'</p>
2010: Restoration Package	<p>'The reform affects people who get more than six, seven, eight, nine and ten children. And we know statistically who they are.'</p> <p>'We want to change the culture that prompts immigrant women to stay home with a crowd of children and let the household economy depend on family allowances.'</p> <p>'It is important to focus on the non-Western immigrants when restoring the Danish economy. Those who benefit must also contribute to it.'</p>	<p>'We have to pay the bill after the crisis, otherwise our children will suffer under the burden of public debt.'</p>
2010: 29 Measures to Combat Fraud		

Table 4. *Continued*

Reform	Danish People's Party	Government/Other coalition parties
2011: Higher Ambitions	<p data-bbox="552 274 644 760">‘The proposal is exactly as we wanted it: It applies to all, but the majority of those who will be affected are non-Western immigrants and descendants.’</p> <p data-bbox="644 274 789 760">‘An ultimatum is required. It is necessary to tell the groups of immigrants that are still outside the labour market; that if they want public benefits, they must meet the demands we pose in terms of taking an education or job training [...] otherwise the consequence is to accept a repatriation benefit and then return to the original home country.’</p>	<p data-bbox="552 760 575 1249">‘The reform will safeguard the economy until 2020 so Danes can be sure there will come no extra bills.’</p>

chauvinistic *because* of the DPP's pivotal position in Danish politics from 2001 to 2011. We evaluate the hypothesis empirically by analyzing the most controversial and significant welfare reform of the 2000s – that is, the Welfare Agreement, which retrenched public pensions and the early retirement programme. Retrenchment in these domains were unlikely to receive support from the DPP because the party is positioned to the left on the socioeconomic dimension, supports welfare state expansion and mobilizes a large cohort of voters among the groups of elderly retirees whose welfare most strongly depends on these schemes. When, in early summer 2003, it was first suggested to appoint an expert commission whose task was to propose a series of reforms of the pension schemes, the DPP was supportive, but the party explicitly wanted the commission to focus particularly on the costs of immigration (Petersen & Petersen 2009), clearly signaling its main interest in the forthcoming discussions.

Unsurprisingly, the proposals announced in 2004 by the expert commission to raise the retirement age and repeal the early retirement scheme were received with little enthusiasm by the DPP, but the party kept a door open for discussions on possible adjustments (Klitgaard & Nørgaard 2009). In the ensuing discussions, the DPP posed two conditions for its support for the reform of the pension schemes. First, it made clear that it would participate in the policy-making process *only* if the negotiations were conducted within an oversized reform coalition that included the Social Democrats. This move indicates that it was important to the DPP that potential electoral blame would be shared, and that the Social Democrats would be unable to attract a large number of disappointed DPP voters (due to the proposed retrenchments). Second, the DPP demanded exclusive negotiations over a separate agreement about policy measures targeting immigrants. The combined effect of these conditions was that the DPP successfully positioned itself as the party that watered down the far-reaching proposals made by the commission, and also made sure that any blame for the reform was shared broadly (Klitgaard & Nørgaard 2009). Additionally, the party catapulted itself into a position to claim credit for new welfare chauvinistic measures included in the twin package concerning the immigrants. Hence, the *Welfare Agreement* and *Future Immigration* initiatives from 2006 (see Table 3) are not independent reforms. The latter is the result of the DPP's welfare chauvinistic preferences and of its strategic effort to transform them into policy.

In other words, the DPP supported the general pension reform *only* because the government accepted the welfare chauvinistic measures in the reform package concerning immigrants. The party chairman explicitly stated that it considered general retrenchment unacceptable unless stricter eligibility rules for foreigners were also considered (*Berlingske Tidende*, 21 June 2010). It was not a problem for the party when all parties outside

the government rejected these measures. The strategy followed allowed the DPP to attain its two-pronged goal: while it had a strong interest in sharing the blame for the welfare reform, it had an equally strong interest in claiming the unshared credit for the welfare chauvinistic reform which targeted immigrants. This strategy allowed the party to preserve its position in the policy coalition and, simultaneously, to satisfy the anti-immigrant preferences of its voters, although it supported retrenching pension reforms. The party revealed similar preferences prior to other reform processes. For example, it entered the negotiation process of the *More People into Work* reform and the *Restoration Package* with lists of welfare chauvinistic demands, whose intended effects for the non-natives were likely to go further than the measures initially proposed by the government. This evidence substantiates that it was the DPP, and not the government, that spurred such policy preferences, and thus provides support to the expectation outlined in *H2a*.

Conclusion

The questions of whether and how PRW parties translate welfare chauvinistic preferences into policy measures are theoretically and empirically relevant not only because welfare state development remains sensitive to ideological preferences of parties in power, but especially because these parties recently abandoned their fringe position and, through significant electoral gains, moved closer to the core of the political systems in Europe.

This analysis focuses on Denmark, whose PRW party (i.e., the DPP) has been electorally successful and, since 2001, has been able to extract direct policy concessions that reflect its welfare chauvinistic views on redistribution. In the first step of our analysis we explored whether labour market laws adopted between 1975 and 2011 retrenched benefits and services, and if non-natives in particular were targets of such retrenchment. We found that most laws expanded welfare, and that laws which targeted specific groups tended to be expansion of existing programmes, but when it occurred, retrenchment was associated with presence of right-of-centre governments. During the period of analysis, two laws directly targeted immigrants and both were aimed at reducing welfare benefits.

The fact that we do not see more direct welfare chauvinist policy measures is most likely due to exogenous constraints, such as anti-discrimination legislation or the need to negotiate with parties that are reluctant to be associated with strong anti-foreigner policies. However, the fact that, albeit rare, some targeted retrenchment instances contain measures which directly reflect welfare chauvinist preferences suggests that immigrants are a very vulnerable category.

Our study also brought evidence that a party can reach welfare chauvinistic policy goals also indirectly through measures that apply to large target groups, but include conditions that are more difficult to fulfill for some sub-groups than for others. To the extent that non-natives find themselves in such a situation, the policy measures reflect indirect welfare chauvinism. In a systematic qualitative case analysis of seven major labour market reforms adopted by a right-wing government whose parliamentary majority depended on the DPP's support, we find evidence of such indirect welfare chauvinism: six out of the seven reforms disadvantaged non-natives.

In order to substantiate the claim that indirect welfare chauvinism is the *result* of the DPP's preferences and political strategy, we delved into the details and process of the adopted reforms in order to investigate the motivations behind them and the political communication surrounding them. Doing so, we found that communication and selective argumentation play a key role. We found that the DPP systematically highlighted the chauvinistic aspects of the legislation, and presented them as its own intended outcomes. In contrast, the other parties in the reform coalitions left such aspects out of their communication. While in the DPP's public communication the problem and the solution of the welfare expenditures were explicitly related to non-natives, mainstream parties linked general welfare retrenchment to macroeconomic difficulties and lack of labour supply in the long run.

Our analysis has shown that in order to understand how parties with welfare chauvinistic preferences achieve their political goals, it is crucial to study the multiple political strategies they can pursue. The theoretical distinction between direct and indirect welfare chauvinism provides a useful framework to study the behaviour of PRW parties in the design of welfare policies. In particular, our study of the DPP and labour market reforms shows that the distinction provides leverage in understanding the structure of redistributive policies. While we cannot rule out the possibility that welfare chauvinism may still have seen light of day without the presence of the DPP and its policy preferences, we feel safe to conclude that the DPP has clearly influenced the social policies in Denmark in the last decade in a welfare chauvinistic direction. Moreover, our study shows that by using differentiated strategies, the DPP can successfully mitigate the voters-office trade-off observed by Afonso (2015) and that the party can in fact maintain (and increase) its electoral support while being in a coalition with parties which implement reforms in areas sensitive for its left-wing voters.

We cannot conclude without reflecting on the general implications of the Danish case study. Our findings suggest that that PRW parties in other countries might be less successful in translating their preferences into public policy, unless they too, like the DPP, are able to move from the fringe

of the party system, diminish internal conflicts, reduce the influence of radical party factions and establish reliable cooperation with other parties. But the Danish case also demonstrates that if a PRW party reaches this stage, it has ample opportunity to convert an electoral fortune into public policy and leave a partisan imprint on welfare state development.

Finally, our study demonstrates the importance of nuanced conceptualizations of notions central to the programmatic position of PRW parties, such as welfare chauvinism. Only using such an approach, scholars are able to capture the mechanisms through which PRW parties pursue their welfare chauvinist preferences. Future research can benefit from incorporating these aspects into studies of how and when PRW parties use different strategies in order to obtain political and policy goals.

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NOTE

1. As indicated by the model fits, none of the models explain a lot of the variation in the dependent variable. However, our interest is not to explain as much variation as possible in the dependent variable, but rather to examine the presence of systematic evidence for direct welfare chauvinism.

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web-site.

Online Appendix A: Coding procedure

Online Appendix B: Descriptive statistics

Online Appendix C: Search strings and search periods

Online Appendix D: Qualitative analysis of reforms

The material required to reproduce the quantitative analysis can be accessed at the Harvard Dataverse: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZLFP3A>